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COMMENTS
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE POLICE
PROTECTION
On March 8, 1952, Arnold Schuster was shot and killed in the street near
his home in New York City.1 Three weeks before, Schuster had given the
New York City Police Department information leading to the arrest of Willie
Sutton, a criminal of national repute and an escaped convict. Schuster's role
was widely publicized and, as a result, he began receiving threatening communications, about which he notified the New York City police. It was alleged
in the complaint in the ensuing action, brought by his father, that the police
provided only limited protection, and then withdrew even that, despite knowledge of the continuing threats; that the police assured Schuster that the threats
were merely the work of "cranks," and that he was in no danger. The suit,
grounded in negligence, was against the City of New York.
The supreme court dismissed the complaint,2 holding that there was no
liability on the part of the city for failure to furnish police protection to an
individual. This freedom from liability was predicated upon the state's sovereign immunity from liability for negligence in the performance of governmental functions. The appellate division, in a per curiam decision,3 affirmed
special term. The court of appeals framed the issue as "whether a municipality
is under any duty to exercise reasonable care for the protection of a person in
Schuster's situation." 4 It found that the city "owes a special duty to use reasonable care for the protection of persons who have collaborated with it in the
arrest or prosecution of criminals, once it reasonably appears that they are in
danger due to their collaboration." 5
The purpose of this comment is to study the effect of Schuster v. City of
New York 6 on the law relating to municipal duty to individuals in the area of
police functions. Intertwined with the problem of whether there is any duty of
care owing to an individual by a municipality in such a situation is the problem
of whether the state, and through it, the municipality, is still cloaked with any
vestige of immunity.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY HISTORICALLY

At common law the sovereign had complete immunity. This seems to have been
derived from the idea that, there being no court with jurisdiction over the king,
he was not suable.7 The history of immunity in America was reviewed by the
1. N.Y. Times, March 9, 1953, p. 1, col. 8.
2. Schuster v. City of New York, 207 Misc. 1102, 121 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
3. Schuster v. City of New York, 286 App. Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S.2d 778 (2d Dep't 1955).
4. Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 80, 154 N.E.2d 534, 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d
265, 269 (1958).
5. Id. at 81, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
6. 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
7. For a general discussion of the origin of sovereign immunity in England and its
transfer to America, see 2 Harper & James, Torts, §§ 29.2, .3 (1956). See also Borchard,
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United States Supreme Court in Feres v. United States,8 wherein, speaking for
the Court, Mr. Justice Jackson noted that "while the political theory that the
king could do no wrong was repudiated in America, a legal doctrine derived
from it that the Crown is immune from any suit to which it has not consented
was invoked on behalf of the Republic and applied by our courts as vigorously
as it had been on behalf of the Crown. ' * Mr. Justice Holmes attempted to
find a rationale for this apparently anachronistic rule of immunity, namely,
that there could be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends. 10
The Supreme Court itself very early in its history tempered the doctrine of
sovereign immunity by allowing a suit in a federal court against the State of
Georgia by a citizen of another state." The clamor that followed this decision
led to the eleventh amendment which expressly forbids suit against a state by
a citizen of another state,' 2 and, by judicial decision, immunity has been extended to suits by a citizen of the defendant stateY 3 Thus, there is a quasiconstitutional authority for state immunity.
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONs--GVEIRNMENTAL AND PROPR IETARY

FuNcTnoNs

Political subdivisions of a state, not being sovereignties, have no immunity
of their own, but they share the immunity of the parent state. The immunity
of the subdivision (municipality) at common law was not complete, but applied
only when it was acting as an agent of the state.14 To determine when it was
so acting, case law developed the distinction between governuental functions,
where immunity was enjoyed, and proprietary functions, where liability sometimes existed.
Generally, a governmental function has the element of duty in it, and is a
power granted for public purposes exclusively.' 5 A proprietary or corporate
function is one which the municipality undertakes of its own discretion, and
looks not merely toward the benefit of the public, but also, or perhaps solely,
to some benefit to be derived by the municipal corporation itself.1 The fact
Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1 (1924); Borchard, Government Responsibility
in Tort (pts. IV-VI), 36 Yale L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27); Borchard, Government Responsibility in Tort (pts. VII, VIII), 28 Colum. L. Rev. 577, 734 (1928).
8. 340 US. 135 (1950), citing: Ickes v. Fox, 300 US. 82 (1937); Reeside v. Walker, 52
U.S. (11 How.) 271 (1850) ; United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846).
9.

340 U.S. at 139.

10. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 US. 349, 353 (1907).
11. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
12. U.S. Const. amend. XI provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall

not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State."
13.

Ex parte State of New York, 256 US. 490 (1921).

14. Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945). See Prossr,
Torts § 109, at 774 (2d ed. 1955).
15. Bailey v. The Mayor, 15 N.Y. (3 Hill) 531 (1842); 43 C.J. Municipal Corporations
§ 1704 (1927).
16. See note 15 supra.
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that the benefit inures ultimately to the public does not render the function a
governmental one.' 7 In practice it is often difficult to determine whether a
function is governmental or proprietary,' 8 but there is no doubt that police
activity is governmental.'" New York City's Charter imposes upon it the duty
of maintaining a police department; 20 thus, when it exercises its police power,
it is exercising a governmental function. It is acting as an 2arm of the state,
and thereby enjoys the privileges of the state in the matter. '
WAIVER OF IMmuNITY-AcTs OF COMMISSION AND OMISSION
When the sovereign was immune a remedy was frequently found for its
wrong by means of a private act of Congress.22 This was cumbersome, however, and hardly the best means of assuring equal justice. Thus, it became
common for sovereign entities to waive their immunity.2 3 New York accomplished this waiver, in 1929, in the Court of Claims Act which provides: "The
state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes
liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the
same rules of law as applied to actions . .. against individuals or corporations .... 124 Although the waiver seems clearly all-inclusive, courts have
been reluctant to find that it extends to all activities of the state government,
and have clung to the old distinction between governmental and corporate
functions, holding in one case25 that the waiver was only as to wrongs committed by the state in its nongovernmental capacity, so that there still was to
be no liability for wrongs committed in a governmental capacity. In that area,
immunity still existed and municipal corporations were still to enjoy the extension of this immunity to them. The outlook of that court so holding was
probably based on the doctrine that statutes in derogation of the sovereignty
of a state should be strictly construed, and the waiver of immunity from
liability must be clearly expressed. 26 Other cases, 27 since 1929, have not been
quite so adamant, however, in refusing to recognize that the legislature did
intend its waiver to have some meaning; this group has found the waiver
effective as to governmental acts of commissive negligence, but not omissive
negligence.
Thus, the appellate division in 1946, in Murrain v. Wilson Line,28 felt safe
in saying: "The law is established that a municipality is answerable for the
17. Missano v. The Mayor, 160 N.Y. 123, 54 N.E. 744 (1899).
18. See 2 Harper & James, Torts § 29.6, at 1621 (1956).
19. 18 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 53.51 (3d ed. 1950).
20. N.Y.C. Charter ch. 18, § 431.
21. 18 McQuillin, op. cit. supra, note 19, at § 53.51.
22. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
23. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1952).
24. N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8.
25. Ferrier v. City of White Plains, 262 App. Div. 94, 28 N.Y.S.2d 218 (2d Dep't 1941).
26. Goldstein v. State, 281 N.Y. 396, 24 N.E.2d 97 (1939); Smith v. State, 227 N.Y.
405, 125 N.E. 841 (1920).
27. See notes 28, 29, & 30 infra.
28. 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1st Dep't 1946).
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negligence of its agents in exercising a proprietary function, and at least for
their negligence of commission in exercising a governmental function . . . but
a municipality is not liable for its failure to exercise a governmental function,
such as to provide police or fire protection." 29 The fourth department implied,
in 1956, that it adhered to the view expressed in Murrain when it upheld a
negligence complaint in Benway v. City of Watert-wn,30 and observed in justifying its holding that the affirmative act alleged was not an omission to exercise
a governmental function. 31 The second department, as late as 1951, also held
that there is no liability for failure to perform a governmental function in
Landby v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,32 but reversed itself, in 1953, in
Rutnkel v. City of New York, 33 declaring: "The surrender of the sovereign immunity from liability with respect to a governmental function, is not limited
to any acts of misfeasance or nonfeasance-commission or omission. The surrender is broad, general and unqualified." 34 The third department broke away
from the "commission-omission" distinction as early as 1936 in Slavin v. State.s
There have been several court of appeals decisions, since 1929, upholding the
validity of complaints in which the negligence alleged was largely of the
omissive variety. In 1945, the court found the state could incur liability to the
plaintiff injured in an accident that occurred as a result of a burned out traffic
bulb that the State Traffic Commission had failed to replace. 0 In 1947, the
court upheld a complaint alleging negligence by the city in failing to discharge
a policeman with a bad record of intoxication, who subsequently shot the
plaintiff. 37 Two cases 38 allowed suit where police took into custody an intoxicated individual who asked for a doctor, and the police delayed in procuring medical services. In 1956, the court of appeals affirmed an appellate
division decision 3 9 upholding a complaint which alleged failure by the city to
properly train, in rapid-fire pistol shooting, a policeman who fired five shots
at a holdup man and put four of them into the holdup victim. Finally, in 1958,
liability was held to be shown in a complaint which alleged that three policemen failed to arrest a fourth whom they knew was intoxicated and a source of
potential danger. 4 The cumulative effect of these cases would seem reasonably
29. Id. at 375, 59 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
30. 1 App. Div. 2d 465, 151 N.Y.S.2d 485 (4th Dep't 1956).
31. Id. at 467, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
32. 278 App. Div. 965, 105 N.Y.S.2d 839 (2d Dep't 1951).
33. 282 App. Div. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485 (2d Dep't 1953). See also AMeistinsky v. City of
New York, 285 App. Div. 1153, 140 N.Y.S.2d 212 (2d Dep't 1955), aff'd mem., 309 N.Y.
998, 132 N.E.2d 900 (1956).
34. 282 App. Div. at 178, 123 N.Y.S.2d at 490-91.
35. 249 App. Div. 72, 291 N.Y.S. 721 (3d Dep't 1936).
36. Foley v. State, 294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E.2d 69 (1945).
37. McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d 419 (1947).
38. O'Grady v. City of Fulton, 4 N.Y.2d 717, 148 N.E.2d 317 (1958); Dunham v. %rdllage
of Canisteo, 303 N.Y. 498, 104 N.E.2d 872 (1952).
39. Meistinsky v. City of New York, 285 App. Div. 1153, 140 N.YS.2d 212 (2d Dp't
1955), aff'd mem., 309 N.Y. 998, 132 N.E.2d 900 (1956).
40. Lubelfeld v. City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 455, 151 N.E.2d 862, 176 N.Y.S.2d 302

(1958).
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to indicate that New York had swept away the last vestige of sovereign immunity. Yet, the supreme court, in dismissing the action in the Schuster case,
preferred to follow Murrain v. Wilson Line,41 rather than the several cases
that followed it, and the appellate division agreed. The reversal by the court
of appeals should clear the air of the uncertainty that existed as to the extent
of New York's waiver of its immunity from suit, since it contains an express
statement of the extent of the waiver of immunity, while previous cases had
only implied it, and had left room for the appellate division to find no total
waiver in the Murrain, Benway and Landby cases.
THE MUNICIPALITY's DUTY TO THE INDIVIDUAL

Once the way has been cleared for a plaintiff to sue on nonfeasance in a
governmental function, his right is then "determined in accordance with the
same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals
or corporations .... '42 As pointed out in the Runkel case, "here as in any
other case, and whether the duty involved be governmental or otherwise, it is
always a fundamental prerequisite to liability that the duty be found to have
been enjoined or undertaken43 for the protection or benefit of the injured person
who is seeking to recover.1
This question of whether there is a duty owed to an individual could not be
reached until it was determined that the area was one in which liability
could exist. Some courts tend to blend the two, finding no duty because there
is an applicable immunity. 44 But there is a real difference; the waiver allows
the possibility of liability; the fact of liability is determined by the ordinary
rules of negligence. The question of whether the police have any obligation
that could give rise to an action by an individual is, of course, only as old as
the waiver of immunity. The problem, probably because of its newness, has
given the courts considerable trouble.
Courts usually approach the problem by going to the source of the duty
imposed on the police or any other arm of government to determine how far
that duty extends. The source, of course, is a statute. The test then is whether
the intent of the statutory enactment is to protect an individual against an
invasion of a property or personal interest. 45 The applicable statutory enactment involved in the Schuster case was chapter 18, section 435 of the New York
City Charter which provides: "The police department and force shall have
the power and it shall be their duty to preserve the public peace, prevent
crime, detect and arrest offenders .
erty . .. .

.

. protect the rights of persons and prop-

The municipal corporation, through its agent, the police, has been held
liable in many situations not directly involving statutory duties. Thus, liability
41.
42.

See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
N.Y. Ct. CI. Act § 8.

43.

282 App. Div. at 178-79, 123 N.Y.S.2d at 491.

44.

See, e.g., Murrain v. Wilson Line, 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1st Dep't

1946).

45.

Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945).
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was found to exist in two similar cases where the police took in an apparently
intoxicated old man to give him a warm place to sleep, and failed to provide
medical care upon discovering he was injured and sick. 46 Other cases found
negligence on the part of the police department in retaining a policeman whom
it knew was inadequately trained, 47 in failing to take into custody an intoxicated policeman who then shot a cab driver, 48 in failing to discharge a policeman who had a record of three intoxications, 49 and in failing to rescind an
erroneous "wanted" bulletin 0 All of the above cases, except the last, were
cited by the court of appeals in the Schuster case, but they indicate, only in a
general way, an obligation on the part of the police for the breach of which
the police (or rather the municipality) incurs liability to individual members
of the community endangered by such breach. Indeed, there seem to be no
cases squarely on the point of whether police protection is owed to individuals
except for the case of Murrain v. Wilson Line,r1 where the finding of an absence of duty to individuals was weakened by the court's failure to distinguish
the separate problems of duty and immunity.
Analogous to the situation of the police department, however, are those of
the fire and water departments. The foremost case in that area is Moch Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co.,52 where the defendant contracted to supply water to fire
hydrants, and thus occupied the position of a water company. Plaintiff's building burned down when defendant failed to furnish sufficient water pressure at
the hydrants after notice of the fire. The court of appeals held that the water
company undertook no obligation to individual property owners who might
have need of the water at the hydrants; it stressed that the negligence was of
54
53
omission and found that the crucial point. Actually, as Prosser points out,
the court appeared reluctant to impose what it foresaw as the potentially overwhelming burden that a contrary holding might entail. Steitz v. City of
Beacon, 5 which followed the Moch case, was express on its fears along that
line. Such a ground for the decisions seems sustainable on the theory that duty
in every instance must be measured by what is reasonable, and an obligation
will not be imposed that is unreasonable in its scopeY0 The supreme court, in
the Schuster case, sought to apply this rationale when it said: "The right of
the public generally to be safeguarded against burglaries does not give a cause
of action to the individual whose home has been burglarized.15 7 The court of
46.
47.
1955),
48.

See note 38 supra.
Meistinsky v. City of New York, 285 App. Div. 1153, 140 N.YS.2d 212 (2d Dep't
aff'd mem., 309 N.Y. 998, 132 N.E2d 900 (1956).
Lubelfeld v. City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 455, 151 N.E2d 862, 176 N.Y.S.2d 302

(1958).
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d 419 (1947).
Slavin v. State, 249 App. Div. 72, 291 N.Y.S. 721 (3d Dep't 1936).
See note 44 supra.
247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
Id. at 169, 159 N.E. at 899.

54. Prosser, Torts, § 90, at 516 (2d ed. 1955).
55. 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945).
56. Prosser, Torts, § 36 (2d ed. 1955).
57. 207 Aisc. at 1107, 121 N.Y.S.2d at 741.

